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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
HARRY CRUZ, #87-A-9804,
Petitioner,
       
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT




NYS Board of Parole,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Harry Cruz, verified on March 28, 2014 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on April 8, 2014.  Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the April 2013 determination denying him
discretionary parole release.  The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on April 11,
2014 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return, including in
camera materials, verified on May 29, 2014 and supported by the May 29, 2014 Letter
Memorandum of Hilary D. Rogers, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, and the
Affirmation of William B. Gannon, Esq., Assistant Counsel to the New York State
Board of Parole, dated April 28, 2014.  The Court has also received and reviewed
petitioner’s Reply thereto (denominated by Answer to Respondent’s Reply), sworn to
on July 20, 2014 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on July 24, 2014. 
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On August 31, 1987 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Kings County,
as a second violent felony offender, to a controlling indeterminate sentence of 25 years
to life upon his convictions of the crimes of Murder 2° and Criminal Possession of a
Weapon 2°.  Petitioner’s conviction/sentencing was affirmed on direct appeal to the
Appellate Division, Second Department.  People v. Cruz, 160 AD2d 893, lv denied 76
NY2d 854.
After having been denied discretionary parole release on one prior occasion,
petitioner made his second appearance before a Parole Board on April 16, 2013. 
Following that appearance a decision was rendered again denying petitioner
discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. 
The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD, INTERVIEW AND
DELIBERATION, THE PANEL HAS DETERMINED THAT IF
RELEASED AT THIS TIME, THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY
THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT
AGAIN VIOLATING THE LAW AND THAT YOUR RELEASE WOULD
BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF SOCIETY 
AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE
CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.  PAROLE IS
DENIED.  
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
TOGETHER WITH YOUR INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT
INCLUDING DISCIPLINE AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION, YOUR
RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT, AND YOUR NEEDS FOR
SUCCESSFUL RE-ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY.  YOUR RELEASE
PLANS AND ANY LETTERS OF REASONABLE ASSURANCE ARE ALSO
NOTED.  MORE COMPELLING, HOWEVER, ARE THE FOLLOWING:
YOUR SERIOUS INSTANT OFFENSES OF MURDER 2 , CPW 2 ,ND ND
AND YOUR PREVIOUS HISTORY [OF] UNLAWFUL BEHAVIOR,
WHICH INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO ASSAULT 2 .  THEND
INSTANT OFFENSES OF MURDER 2  INVOLVED YOU, IN CONCERTND
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WITH CO-DEFENDANTS, CAUSING THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM BY
SHOOTING HIM ONE TIME IN THE HEAD.  ACCORDING TO YOUR
FILE, THE VICTIM WAS BEATEN PRIOR TO BEING SHOT.  
YOUR POSITIVE PROGRAMING AND LETTERS OF REASONABLE
ASSURANCE ARE ALL NOTED.  HOWEVER, PREVIOUS UNLAWFUL
BEHAVIOR, PROBATION SUPERVISION AND A SHORTER
SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION HAVE ALL FAILED TO PREVENT
YOU FROM ENGAGING IN BEHAVIOR THAT ULTIMATELY
RESULTED IN THE SENSELESS DEATH OF THE VICTIM.  THE
RECORD REFLECTS THAT WHILE AN ALTERCATION BETWEEN
YOU AND THE VICTIM TOOK PLACE SOME TIME PRIOR TO HIM
BEING SHOT, YOU RETURNED LATER WITH TWO INDIVIDUALS
AND THEY PROCEEDED TO BEAT THE VICTIM.  THIS ULTIMATELY
SHOWS THAT YOU WERE IN NO IMMINENT DANGER AND THIS
UNFORTUNATE DEATH COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED.  
THEREFORE, BASED ON ALL REQUIRED FACTORS IN THE FILE
CONSIDERED, DISCRETIONARY RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS NOT
APPROPRIATE.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the April 2013 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on September 18,
2013.  The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and recommendation within
the four month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c).  This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law.  In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
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and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
A significant portion of the petition is focused, in one way or another, on the
assertion that the parole denial determination was improperly based solely on the nature
of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration, as well as his prior criminal record,
without adequate consideration of other relevant statutory factors.  A Parole Board,
however, need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider
in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly
discuss each of those factors in its written decision.  See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197,
lv granted 23 NY3d 903, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State
4 of 7 
[* 4]
Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department,
the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the
Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed
the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not
contradicted, by the facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s
weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh
each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.” 
Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report and transcript of petitioner’s
April 16, 2013 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information
with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including petitioner’s
therapeutic/educational programing records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment
Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary record and release plans/community support
in addition to the circumstances of the crime underlying petitioner’s incarceration and his
prior criminal record. The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript to
suggest that the Parole Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or
otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. 
Indeed, before the April 16, 2013 Parole Board appearance was concluded one of the 
presiding commissioners inquired of petitioner as follows: “Sir, we’ve covered everything
that I needed to cover.  Is there anything that I left out or anything more important that
you want to tell us before we finish?”  Petitioner responded by simply apologizing to the
family of the deceased.  
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In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
incarceration as well as his prior criminal record.  See Hamilton v. New York State
Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268, Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 AD3d 1077, lv granted 23
NY3d 907 and Bonilla v. New York State Board of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070. 
Executive Law §259-c(4)  was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. 
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”   To the extent petitioner argues1
that the Parole Board failed to adopt rules or regulations implementing the above-
referenced amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4), the Court finds that the
promulgation of the October 5, 2011 memorandum from Andrea W. Evans, then
Prior to the amendment the statute had  provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall1
“. . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .” 
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Chairwoman, New York State Board of Parole, satisfied the Parole Board’s obligations
with respect to the 2011 amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4).  See Partee v. Evans,
117 AD3d 1258, lv denied 24 NY3d 901 and Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted
23 NY3d 903.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: December 9, 2014 at 
Indian Lake, New York.        __________________________
                                                                                             S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice
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